Can Pantheism Explain Morality?

Can pantheism explain morality? And, the fight-or-flight response and the Fall
Published: 13 May 2012(GMT+10)

Fred K. from the United States writes:

I read with interest your response to the Euthyphro dilemma. I was a Christian for 30 years, and am now a Pantheist. If I could attribute any one cause of my “slide” into Pantheism, I would say that it would be this dilemma. Of course, you must realize that the answer you give to the dilemma is Aquinas’ classic answer. But I’m not sure you realize the full implications of it. If goodness is attributed to God’s “nature,” then goodness can no longer be an act of God’s will. It is as though God is divided into two parts, a “willing” part that makes decisions and acts, and a “nature” which He cannot control. In a sense you are still on one horn of the dilemma. God’s personhood which wills and acts is now subject to, and therefore “lower” than God’s nature, which is immutable. Aquinas got around this by saying God’s nature is the exact same thing as God. But if God is a natural thing, why not say that God IS the universe? This is the position I eventually came around to. I believe goodness is woven into the fabric of the universe (much as you believe that goodness is woven into God’s nature) in the same way mathematics is.

CMI’s Dr Jonathan Sarfati responds:

Dear Mr K.

Thank you for writing. I presume you are referring to What is ‘good’? (Answering the Euthyphro Dilemma) I honestly can’t see how pantheism solves any problem, since this basically denies a distinction between good and evil.

A nature of a thing is the set of propositions that describe that thing, or the set of its attributes. I fail to see why it’s a problem that God’s actions are the result of His attributes such as perfect goodness, and that His commandments flow out of this.

It seems that you have equivocated on the meaning of “nature”, to go from what God’s “nature” means, correctly defined as above, to God is a “natural” thing, which means nothing supernatural.

One problem is that the universe is not eternal (see If God created the universe, then who created God?). Another one is that there is clearly evil in the current universe, as well as violence and suffering. Thus pantheism normally subsumes good and evil into the universe.

Pantheism normally subsumes good and evil into the universe.

Also, if God is identical to the universe, what is the point of this statement? How does this differ from “there is no God; the Cosmos is all there was, is and ever shall be” (Carl Sagan)? Giving the universe another name adds nothing to substance.

Jonathan Sarfati

Fred K. then responded:

Thank you for responding so quickly. You are really making me think!

You say

“it would be a problem if God was enslaved to something *outside* himself, but not a problem if his own set of attributes (nature) govern His actions and commandments.”

The problem I see is: how is it then that God has a free will? He has to do whatever is best, and cannot do anything else. As humans, we say that we have a nature and a will, because we can choose to do something that is against our nature: we can turn down that second helping of ice cream or resist sin. But God, it seems, has no choice. He is like a dog that will always wag its tail given the same circumstances. Aquinas recognized the problem, and said that although God had to do good when it was necessary, there were circumstances where a particular good response was non-necessary. I take this to be either a non-moral decision or a choice between equally good options. But do Aquinas’ non-necessary circumstances really exist? Are there really no non-moral choices for a Being that knows the complete outcome of any choice He makes? And if there were a choice between a number of equally good choices, how is choosing one an act of the will? This seems more choosing at random, which even a computer can do.

I had hoped not to give my own theory of Pantheist ethics, but since you are curious I’ll give it a go. I see ethical rules as basically paralleling mathematical rules. Just as the inequality 2<3 is true, true ethical statements are built into the fabric of the universe. The is/ought “problem” really isn’t a problem at all. We use such terminology all the time outside of ethics: Wood IS stronger than styrofoam, so we OUGHT to build chairs out of wood. Nobody gets hung up on whether this is a true statement or not. I agree with Sam Harris that moral decisions which maximize the well being of sentient beings are better than those that do not. This statement is as axiomatic as 2<3. I do not see a single source of good (such as a God or the universe): there is only better or worse. Things can only be good or bad in relation to other things: there has to be two sides of the equation. (Or to continue the analogy: the inequality-2<3; mercy is better than sacrifice) Certain actions are better than others, and we should strive to do the ones that are best.

Dr Sarfati replied again:

Hi again Fred

Sorry about the delay in replying. I wasn’t sure what point there was in continuing, and I have been away a lot on ministry.

As said with the Euthyphro dilemma and the omnipotence issue, God is not bound by anything outside himself, just by His own nature. As far as His creation is concerned, He is free to create as He pleases. This consideration was actually one of the Christian world view issues that led to the development of modern science. I.e. Since God is sovereign, He was free to create as He pleased. So the only way to find out how His creation works is toinvestigate and experiment, not rely on man-made philosophies as did the ancient Greeks. See for example Chapter 17 of The Greatest Hoax on Earth?

But whatever the alleged problems with Christian theism, pantheism seems to have far more. E.g. Professor John Warwick Montgomery pointed out:

“Pantheism … is neither true nor false; it is something much worse, viz., entirely trivial. We had little doubt that the universe was here anyway; by giving it a new name (“God”) we explain nothing. We actually commit the venerable intellectual sin of Word Magic, wherein the naming of something is supposed to give added power either to the thing named or to the semantic magician himself.”1


Jonathan Sarfati

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May 12, 2012